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ENFORCING PRINCIPLED CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
FEDERAL POWER: A NEO-FEDERALIST REFINEMENT OF
JUSTICE CARDOZO’S JURISPRUDENCE

ROBERT J. PUSHAW, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Since the New Deal of the mid-1930s, Congress has asserted virtually absolute power to (1) “regulate Commerce ... among the
States,” (2) tax and spend for the “general Welfare,” and (3) delegate
“legislative Power[ ]” to the executive branch. From 1937 until 1994,
the Supreme Court rejected every claim that such statutes had
exceeded Congress’s Article I authority and usurped the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. Over the past quarter
century, conservative Justices have tried, and failed, to develop
principled constitutional limits on the federal government while
keeping the modern administrative and social welfare state largely
intact.
The conservatives’ attempt to legally restrict, but not unduly hamstring, federal power would benefit from a close study of Benjamin
Cardozo’s opinions from 1934 to 1938. In constitutional challenges
to expansive New Deal laws, Justice Cardozo carefully evaluated
each statute’s text, the economic and social considerations that
prompted its enactment, the facts presented, precedent, and the need
to maintain the Constitution’s basic structure. That last factor
proved to be especially complicated because the Constitution creates
a democracy in which legislative acts are presumptively valid, but
prohibits Congress from either delegating its legislative power to the

* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale,
1988. This Article benefitted greatly from critiques by participants in the “Federalism Now”
symposium at the University of California-Berkeley School of Law in November 2017. Thanks
also to Bill Kelley, Kurt Lash, Grant Nelson, and Jim Pfander for their helpful comments.
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executive department or invading the states’ jurisdiction over local
matters. Cardozo balanced these constitutional concerns by deferring
to the federal government’s broad but reasonable exercise of authority, while invalidating merely expedient laws that either gave Congress untrammeled power or the executive unbridled discretion.
Although Justice Cardozo witnessed the triumph of his generally
deferential approach to judicial review in 1937, his effort to craft
modest legal restraints on Congress died along with him the next
year. President Roosevelt appointed nine Justices between 1937 and
1943—all ardently pro-New Deal politicians or academics who
quickly abandoned the previously established constitutional limits
on federal power.
The Court under Chief Justices Warren and Burger entrenched
this precedent, which has left the conservative majority on the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts with a dilemma. On the one hand,
they value stability and hence seek to respect stare decisis and preserve the existing government structure. On the other hand, they
strive to expound constitutional provisions according to their original meaning. The conservative Justices have struck a strange compromise: reciting the originalist mantra that the federal government
is confined to its enumerated powers, yet identifying only a few (and
ineffective) limits based not on historical constitutional materials,
but rather on a strained reading of cases decided between 1937 and
1994.
As it turns out, however, the results of many of those cases can be
grounded in authentic originalist principles, even though the Court’s
proffered rationales cannot be. Therefore, the conservative Justices
need not continue to distort that precedent to discover previously
unnoticed “limits” that are then fleshed out in pure common law
fashion, Cardozo-style. Rather, these Justices should adopt a “NeoFederalist” approach: formulating legal rules, rooted in the Constitution’s text and structure as historically understood, that can be
consistently applied to allow the kind of generous yet circumscribed
federal power that Cardozo endorsed. This Article sets forth such
concrete legal principles to guide judicial review under the Commerce
Clause, the Taxing and Spending Power, and the nondelegation
doctrine. My analysis demonstrates that, contrary to the assertions
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of many judges and scholars, such a genuinely legal framework is
neither unworkable nor simplistic.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1937, the Supreme Court has not consistently developed
and applied principles of constitutional law that allow robust, but
genuinely limited, federal regulatory power. Liberal Justices have
had little interest in such an intellectual project because they favor
political, rather than judicial, review of the gargantuan administrative state.1 Meanwhile, conservative Justices for the past three decades have repeatedly tried, without success, to devise meaningful
legal restrictions on federal authority that would preserve state
control over local matters.2 Despite this failure, the three veteran
conservatives (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito)
will likely continue their efforts, especially since they have been
joined by Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, two avowed defenders of traditional constitutional federalism.3
The Court’s attempt to legally confine, but not unduly hamper,
federal power would benefit from a close study of the opinions of
Benjamin Cardozo, who became a Justice in 1932.4 Justice Cardozo
approved most of the progressive New Deal economic and social
welfare legislation championed by Democratic President Franklin
D. Roosevelt (FDR), but identified and enforced certain constitutional boundaries.5 Cardozo’s method consisted of carefully interpreting and applying challenged statutory provisions in light of
1. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1465-81 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) (assailing the majority for striking down
aggregate contribution limits in campaign finance statutes instead of deferring to Congress’s
policy determination that such laws help prevent corruption); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 589, 599-646 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) (rejecting various constitutional challenges
to the Affordable Care Act and suggesting that any disputes over it should be resolved
through the political process).
2. See infra notes 136-39, 153-76, 194-224, 270-74 and accompanying text.
3. See Ilya Shapiro & Frank Garrison, Neil Gorsuch and the Structural Constitution,
NAT’L REV. (Feb. 22, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/02/neil-gorsuchlimited-government-constitutionalist/ [https://perma.cc/CY5U-GQFA]; Elaine S. Povich &
Alayna Alvarez, What Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court Could Mean for States’ Rights, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUST STATELINE BLOG (July 11, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/07/11/what-trumps-pick-for-supreme-court-could-mean-forstates-rights [https://perma.cc/L59F-HWRC].
4. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 471 (1998).
5. See infra Part II.
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Congress’s overall purposes and policies, the particular facts
presented, precedent, and the necessity of preserving the Constitution’s basic structure.6 He set forth constitutional standards that
could be fleshed out and adapted on a case-by-case basis, rather
than fixed legal rules rooted in the historical Constitution that
would more concretely curb the discretion of federal judges (and the
coordinate branches).7
Cardozo’s common law approach sought to reconcile two fundamental constitutional tenets that sometimes pull in different directions. First, the Constitution establishes a democratic system in
which legislative acts are presumptively valid.8 Second, the Constitution limits the federal government. Separation of powers prohibits Congress from transferring its Article I “legislative Power[ ]”9 to
the executive department, and federalism forecloses any interpretation of federal powers that would effectively make them absolute
and thereby destroy states’ jurisdiction over local matters.10 Justice
Cardozo resolved such tensions by deferring to the federal government’s broad but reasonable exercise of authority to address the
Depression, while invalidating merely expedient laws that either
gave Congress untrammeled power or the executive unbridled
discretion, or both.11
Although Justice Cardozo lived long enough to witness the triumph of his generally deferential style of judicial review in 1937, his
quest to impose modest restrictions on Congress died along with
him the next year.12 In hindsight, Cardozo’s case-sensitive approach
likely could have worked only on a Court staffed by common law
masters like him. Alas, President Roosevelt appointed nine Justices
between 1937 and 1943 who were not experienced judicial crafts6. See infra Part II.
7. Cardozo believed that statutes had to be evaluated against the benchmark of a
Constitution that does not contain clear legal rules which can be applied to decide controversies about the scope of governmental powers. See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
440-44 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
8. See KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 367, 389, 429, 435, 451, 572, 575 (describing Cardozo’s
view that judges in a constitutional democracy must generally respect legislative decisions).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
10. See, e.g., A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551, 554
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra notes 61, 98-99, 129-33 and accompanying text.
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men, but rather ardently pro-New Deal politicians (Hugo Black,
Stanley Reed, Frank Murphy, Harlan Stone, James Byrnes, and
Robert Jackson) or academics (Felix Frankfurter and Wiley
Rutledge), or both (William Douglas, the SEC chair and former Yale
Law professor).13 These Justices had neither the expertise nor the
inclination to incrementally develop doctrines that would balance
the federal government’s desire to expand its regulatory scope
against the need to respect constitutional constraints on federal
power.14 Instead, FDR’s Court swiftly abandoned any such limits.15
Chief Justices Warren (1954-1969) and Burger (1969-1986) and
their colleagues entrenched this precedent,16 which has left the
conservative majority on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts with a
dilemma. On the one hand, they value stability and hence seek to
honor stare decisis and to protect the basic modern governmental
framework (a practical necessity, however unpalatable in theory).17
On the other hand, the professed aim of these Justices has been to
expound constitutional provisions in light of their original meaning
and understanding.18 The conservatives have struck an odd compromise. They have recited the originalist mantra that the federal government is confined to its enumerated powers, yet identified only a
few (and ineffective) restraints that are not based on historical constitutional materials but rather on an extremely strained reading
of cases decided from 1937 to 1994.19
As it turns out, however, the results of many (albeit not all) of
those cases can be justified on bona fide originalist principles, even

13. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG , THE SUPREME COURT REBORN : THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 154-56, 210-12, 220 (1995). Rutledge alone had ever
been a judge, and even he had served only briefly after a distinguished career as a law professor and dean. Id. at 212; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 248
(1993).
14. See LEUCHTENBURG , supra note 13, at 216-19, 228.
15. See id.; see also infra notes 128-34, 145-50, 188, 192-93, 268-70 and accompanying text
(analyzing the relevant cases).
16. See infra notes 100, 135-37, 151-52, 192-93, 270-71 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
18. Justice Scalia nicely encapsulated this dilemma by admitting that he was a “fainthearted originalist” who would not enforce the Constitution’s original meaning if established
precedent and practical considerations dictated otherwise. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN . L. REV. 849, 861-64 (1989).
19. See infra Part III.
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though the Court’s proffered rationales cannot be.20 Therefore, the
conservative Justices need not continue to distort that precedent to
discover previously unnoticed “limits” that are then developed in
pure common law fashion à la Cardozo. Rather, these Justices can
formulate legal rules, grounded in the Constitution’s text and structure as historically understood, that can be consistently applied
today to permit the kind of generous yet circumscribed federal
power that Cardozo endorsed.21 This “Neo-Federalist” approach
would help the conservatives resolve their conundrum.22
The foregoing themes will be explored in three Parts. Part I
provides a brief account of the jurisprudential philosophy that
Cardozo followed as a state judge, which carried over into his work
as a Justice. Part II examines the Court’s holdings, and Justice
Cardozo’s separate opinions, concerning Congress’s authority to
(1) “regulate Commerce ... among the several States”;23 (2) tax and
spend “for the ... general Welfare”;24 and (3) delegate its “legislative
Power[ ]”25 to the executive branch. Part III criticizes FDR’s appointees for eliminating legal constraints on the federal government
and suggests that today’s conservative Justices, in attempting to
revive such limits without hamstringing the federal government,
look to Cardozo’s opinions for reassurance that such a balance is
possible. Instead of using his pure common law methodology, however, the Court should employ Neo-Federalism to develop legal
principles that are actually derived from the Constitution’s text,
structure, and history.

20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2, III.C.
22. Neo-Federalism seeks to (1) recapture “the original meaning, intent, and understanding of constitutional provisions,” and (2) analyze those historical principles in light of
the intervening 230 years of legislative and judicial precedent to develop legal rules that can
be applied today in a way that will not be unduly disruptive. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A NeoFederalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1516, 1541-42
(2007); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM . & MARY
L. REV. 1289, 1289, 1311-24, 1328-41 (2005).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
25. Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
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I. CARDOZO’S STATE JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
Cardozo ascended to the Supreme Court after earning a reputation as America’s greatest judge during his service on New York’s
highest court.26 Four of his achievements were especially relevant
to his later work as a Justice.
First, Cardozo brilliantly synthesized and adapted New York’s
common law to meet shifting industrial, commercial, and social
conditions.27 He elaborated on his approach in The Nature of the
Judicial Process by acknowledging the inherent uncertainty of
law—and its evolution to reflect changing ideas about social welfare and morality—without succumbing to the notion that legal
judgments reflect mere political or ideological will.28 Rather, Cardozo argued that statutes and precedent yielded legal principles
that genuinely constricted judges’ range of decisionmaking, but with
room to adjust the law to new circumstances.29
Second, and relatedly, he asserted that courts had more freedom
to account for public policy considerations in constitutional—as
contrasted with common law—cases.30 Cardozo interpreted the Constitution and its implementing precedent as creating legal doctrines
that were stable, yet could be modified based on the facts of each
case in light of political, economic, and social realities.31 He applied
this same approach when he became a Justice.32
Third, Cardozo questioned the idea that federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting states from depriving persons of
“liberty” or “property” without “due process of law” implicitly enshrined a substantive rule of freedom of contract based on laissez
faire economics.33 Rather, he urged judicial deference to reasonable
26. See KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 4, 455-56, 461-71 (detailing the national consensus that
Cardozo was the only legal figure with the stature to replace the retiring Justice Holmes).
27. For an excellent summary and analysis of these cases, see id. at 130-36, 223-360, 41625, 434-35, 451.
28. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO , THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14, 24-25 (1921).
29. Id. at 10-11, 14-15, 19-31, 34-36, 40-52, 58-59, 62-180.
30. See id. at 17-18, 76-84, 169-70; KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 366-67, 389, 500-02.
31. See, e.g., Klein v. Maravelas, 114 N.E. 809, 810-11 (N.Y. 1916).
32. See infra Part II.
33. See KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 362-70 (discussing Judge Cardozo’s key opinions and
those of his state court colleagues).
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state regulations designed to promote the public good (for example,
by protecting workers and consumers from the negative effects of
industrialization), even if doing so interfered with the previously
unfettered economic rights of employers and businesses.34 Not surprisingly, when Cardozo became a Justice, he eventually helped
persuade a majority of the Court to repudiate its substantive due
process jurisprudence.35 Relatedly, Justice Cardozo challenged the
laissez faire notion that Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce was innately suspect because it interfered with market
forces.36
Fourth, Judge Cardozo held that state legislatures could delegate
their legislative (rulemaking) power to expert executive agencies or
private parties, as long as the legislature sought to achieve a valid
public purpose and set forth the basic policy and legal standards to
guide the executive’s exercise of discretion.37 As a Justice, he applied
the same reasoning to congressional delegations.38
In short, Cardozo had developed a sophisticated approach to
adjudication by the time he arrived on the Supreme Court.39 During
his brief tenure, he emerged as a key figure in transforming constitutional law.40
II. CARDOZO’S WORK AS A JUSTICE
Cardozo joined the Court shortly before FDR spearheaded the
Democrats’ sweeping victories in both the presidential and congres-

34. Id.
35. The landmark case was West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which
established that courts would sustain state economic legislation (such as the minimum wage
law at issue) as long as it had a rational basis—as virtually all such laws do. See id. at 386400; see also KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 491-507 (describing Cardozo’s influence in reversing
the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence as well as its prior rigid interpretation of
Article I’s Contracts Clause as strictly prohibiting states from any impairment of contract obligations). This Article will not delve into substantive due process analysis of state law, but
rather will focus on federal legislation.
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 370-75 (examining cases involving delegation and
related separation-of-powers issues).
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
40. See KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 568-72.
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sional elections of November 1932.41 The ensuing avalanche of New
Deal legislation raised three critical issues about the breadth of
federal power. First, Congress asserted unprecedented regulatory
authority under the Commerce Clause, often in tandem with its
power to enact laws “necessary and proper” to carry into effect its
other enumerated powers.42 Second, Congress claimed that it could
tax and spend to achieve breathtakingly ambitious economic and
social “general Welfare”43 goals. Third, these Commerce Clause and
General Welfare statutes delegated extraordinary rulemaking discretion to the executive department. These three issues will be examined in turn.
A. The Commerce Clause
Before 1937, the Court had long interpreted the Commerce
Clause as imposing two requirements. First, Congress could
regulate only “commerce” (defined as the sale of goods and transportation), not antecedent productive activities such as farming,
manufacturing, mining, and labor.44 Second, such commerce either
had to cross state lines or have “direct” interstate effects (such as a
local railroad that was connected to an interstate one).45 Applying
this precedent, the Court invalidated most federal New Deal legislation.46
The key case, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
involved a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
authorizing the President to promulgate “codes of fair competition”
for all industries and trades, which he invoked to regulate not merely unfair competitive practices but also matters such as wages and
41. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG , FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 19321940, at 3, 17 (1963).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
43. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
44. See, e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1895) (holding that,
because manufacturing was not “commerce,” Congress could not extend its antitrust laws to
a national corporation’s purchase of sugar refineries that gave it a monopoly of the sugar
market). For a summary and analysis of these cases, see Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial
Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 68-71 (1999).
45. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 71-77 (examining relevant precedent).
46. See LEUCHTENBURG , supra note 13, at 85, 89, 96.
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hours.47 Pursuant to the NIRA, the President (through his subordinates) enacted a Poultry Code and enforced it even against enterprises that operated entirely within a state—including the defendant, a small company that slaughtered and sold chickens in a small
area in New York.48 The Court ruled that, even if the statute
regulated “commerce” (the poultry business), Congress could not
reach local trade that had at most an “indirect” effect on interstate
commerce.49 In a concurrence, Justice Cardozo emphasized that,
although Congress had broad power under the Commerce Clause,
sustaining this particular law regulating labor transactions within
a state
would obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer
rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording
instruments at the center. A society such as ours “is an elastic
medium which transmits all tremors throughout its territory;
the only question is of their size.” The law is not indifferent to
considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do
not become interstate and national because of distant repercussions.... To find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost
everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the
exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there
will be an end to our federal system.50

The Court reaffirmed Schechter in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.51
That case addressed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which
(1) set prices on coal sales that took place either in interstate commerce or within a state but affected such commerce, and (2) governed labor relations in coal mining.52 The Court invalidated this
law on the ground that Congress could not regulate productive activities such as labor because they are not “commerce” and have only an “indirect” impact on commerce among the states.53 In dissent,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

295 U.S. 495, 521-27 (1935).
Id. at 519-22, 542-43.
Id. at 542-50.
Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Id. at 278-84.
Id. at 297-310.
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Justice Cardozo (joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone) contended
that precedent did not necessarily dictate this result.54 Rather, he
argued that the particular price-fixing provisions, as applied to the
facts, were legitimate because they concerned coal sales that were
either interstate or “directly or intimately” affected interstate
commerce.55
Justice Cardozo’s generous, but still limited, interpretation of the
Commerce Clause prevailed the very next year (1937). In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., he joined a bare majority in sustaining the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which had been
applied to a huge steel company.56 The Court held that Congress
had reasonably determined that it was necessary and proper to implement its Commerce Clause power by sweeping in even noncommercial, intrastate activity (such as labor relations) that bore a
“close and substantial” relation to interstate commerce.57 The Court
documented the steel corporation’s extensive national operations to
support the conclusion that labor disputes at its plants could seriously disrupt interstate commerce,58 but cautioned that Congress
could not reach “local” activities that had merely an “indirect and
remote” effect on such commerce.59
Jones & Laughlin Steel might be defended as an extension of
precedent allowing Congress to regulate intrastate activities that
had a direct, intimate, and significant impact on interstate commerce, while still reserving a slice of state power over wholly local
commerce.60 Shortly after Cardozo’s death, however, FDR’s appointees eliminated all Commerce Clause limits.61

Id. at 324-41 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Id. at 324-30.
301 U.S. 1, 34-43 (1937).
Id. at 37, 40-43.
Id. at 26-28.
Id. at 41-43.
See BARRY CUSHMAN , RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3-7, 11-43, 139-225 (1998). Most other scholars, however,
characterize Jones & Laughlin Steel and other 1937 cases as a radical break. See, e.g.,
LEUCHTENBURG , supra note 13, at 213-36.
61. See infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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B. Taxing and Spending for the “General Welfare”
Article I authorizes Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”62 The power to
tax contains two express limitations. First, duties, imposts, and
excises (known as “indirect” taxes) “shall be uniform throughout the
United States.”63 Second, all other taxes (labeled “direct”) must be
apportioned by population, except those levied on income.64 Moreover, “taxes” have always been defined as enforced contributions to
support the government—as distinguished from “penalties,” which
are exactions designed to punish an illegal act (usually a violation
of a regulatory law).65 In short, Congress could only impose “taxes”
and had to ensure uniformity and apportionment when those
requirements applied.
In contrast to taxation, Congress’s power to spend for the “general
Welfare” does not import a clear definition or contain any explicit
textual restrictions, beyond a common sense understanding that
“general” welfare does not include specific individuals or states.66
Because most Framers and Ratifiers envisioned a relatively small
federal government, they likely expected that Congress would have
the ability to raise a modest amount of revenue sufficient to honor
America’s debts, pay for the military, and further the nation’s welfare (especially by encouraging international commerce).67 In
particular, the original conception of “general Welfare” was the provision of public goods such as interstate infrastructure that must be
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
63. Id.
64. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Under the original Constitution, it was unclear if “Taxes”
included those on income. A 1913 Amendment made that power explicit and also eliminated
any requirement that federal income taxes be uniform or apportioned by state population. See
id. amend. XVI; see also Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 134
TAX NOTES 97, 110 (2012) (highlighting the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” taxes).
65. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936); see also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20, 34-44 (1922) (invalidating Congress’s purported “tax” on employers who had
used child labor because it was in reality a “penalty” for violating a regulatory provision
banning such labor); id. at 40-43 (citing several other cases limiting Congress to levying
“taxes”).
66. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 64-68.
67. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 312-14 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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made available to everyone, not direct transfer payments from one
group of citizens to another.68
More controversially, in the 1790s Madison claimed that the
“general Welfare” encompassed only the other seventeen subjects
enumerated in Section 8 of Article I (for example, regulating interstate commerce and building post offices).69 Hamilton, on the
other hand, maintained that the “general Welfare” provision was an
independent grant that could extend to anything that genuinely
promoted the national interest.70 Hamilton’s interpretation seems
more consistent with the Clause’s broad language, which could
accommodate congressional spending for needs that the Founders
themselves may not have anticipated but that later emerged and
were truly national in scope.71
In any event, the Madison-Hamilton debate remained largely
academic for well over a century because Congress exercised its
Taxing and Spending Power so sparingly.72 The New Deal ended
such legislative self-restraint.
Once again, the Court initially thwarted Congress. For instance,
the 1936 case of United States v. Butler involved a federal tax on
processors of agricultural commodities, the proceeds of which went
not to the Treasury but to farmers who reduced their crop acreage
(and thereby helped stabilize prices).73 The Court purported to adopt
the broad Hamiltonian position, but invalidated the tax on three
related grounds.74 First, the statute did not technically impose a
“tax” at all, because Congress had expropriated money from one

68. See Richard A. Epstein, A Most Improbable 1787 Constitution: A (Mostly) Originalist
Critique of the Constitutionality of the ACA, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 28, 30-32 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger &
Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013). Nonetheless, the Taxing and Spending Clauses are worded
so broadly as to authorize Congress to raise sufficient revenue to meet all national and
military needs, even if they mushroom far beyond what the Founders could have imagined.
The Hamiltonian vision could accommodate such growth. See infra notes 70-71, 74, 81-91, 9497.
69. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 19-20 (1994).
70. See id. at 5-24.
71. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); Engdahl, supra note 69, at 44-48.
72. See Engdahl, supra note 69, at 22-40.
73. 297 U.S. 1, 53-57 (1936).
74. Id. at 65-67, 77. Professor Engdahl argues that the Court did not actually understand
Hamilton’s position, which would have counseled upholding the tax. See Engdahl, supra note
69, at 35-43.
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private group for the benefit of another, rather than for Americans
as a whole through payment to the federal government.75 Second,
Congress could use its Taxing and Spending Power only to further
the “general” (that is, national) welfare, not to invade an area of
purely “local” concern such as agricultural production that the
Tenth Amendment reserved to the states.76 Third, Congress could
not allocate federal funds to purchase compliance by either states or
farmers on a subject within the states’ exclusive domain, even if
their acquiescence was voluntary.77 The Court concluded that any
“asserted power of choice is illusory”: Congress had engaged in
“coercion by economic pressure” because farmers who refused to
cooperate would forfeit benefits that could well lead to financial
ruin.78
Justice Cardozo joined the dissent of Justice Stone, who argued
that Congress’s power in this field was plenary and thus not limited
by the Tenth Amendment.79 Furthermore, Justice Stone contended
that Congress could address a national economic problem through
noncoercive “conditional gifts of money,” such as its offer here to pay
farmers if they voluntarily decreased their crop production.80
The dissenters’ view prevailed the very next year in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis.81 Steward Machine dealt with a Social
Security Act (SSA) provision that imposed a federal unemployment
tax on employers, but gave them a credit for taxes they had paid
into a state unemployment fund that satisfied specific and detailed
federal criteria.82 The SSA also granted participating states money
to help them administer their unemployment funds.83 The Court
sustained this statute and rejected the company’s claim that the
SSA had unduly undermined federalism by coercing states and
invading their reserved powers.84

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Butler, 297 U.S. at 58-61, 70, 75-76.
Id. at 62-70.
Id. at 70-78.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 78-88 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Id. at 85-88.
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
See id. at 574-76.
Id. at 577-78.
See id. at 587-98.
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Writing for a razor-thin majority, Justice Cardozo initially held
that the SSA served the “general Welfare” because mass unemployment was a problem “national in area and dimensions,” which states
acting independently could not resolve.85 Experience had shown that
states which had adopted unemployment compensation tax laws
were at a competitive economic disadvantage compared to states
that had not, and unemployed citizens of the latter laggard states
had demanded massive financial assistance from the federal
government.86 The Court ruled that, given this factual context,
Congress had reasonably set up a program in which the federal and
state governments would cooperate for the common good.87 Furthermore, Justice Cardozo maintained that each state could freely
choose (1) whether it wished to take advantage of the federal credit
and other assistance being offered, and (2) if so, to create and
implement any unemployment compensation scheme that the state
deemed appropriate, as long as its law met the minimum federal
standards.88
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress had merely “induc[ed]” or “persua[ded]”—rather than “coerced” or “comp[elled]”—
states to create unemployment compensation funds.89 Justice Cardozo then carefully explained, and circumscribed, this holding:
We do not say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of
Congress, if it is laid upon the condition that a state may escape
its operation through the adoption of a statute unrelated in
subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of national
policy and power. No such question is before us. In the tender of
this credit Congress does not intrude upon fields foreign to its
function. The purpose of its intervention ... is to safeguard its
own treasury and as an incident to that protection to place the
states upon a footing of equal opportunity. Drains upon its own
resources are to be checked; obstructions to the freedom of the
states are to be leveled. It is one thing to impose a tax dependent
upon the conduct of the taxpayers, or of the state in which they
live, where the conduct to be stimulated or discouraged is
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 586-89.
Id. at 587-89.
See id.
See id. at 589-98.
See id. at 589-91.

954

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:937

unrelated to the fiscal need subserved by the tax in its normal
operation, or to any other end legitimately national.... It is quite
another thing to say that a tax will be abated upon the doing of
an act that will satisfy the fiscal need, the tax and the alternative being approximate equivalents. In such circumstances, if in
no others, inducement or persuasion does not go beyond the
bounds of power. We do not fix the outermost line. Enough for
present purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is
within it. Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the
future.90

In this crucial (and long overlooked) passage, Justice Cardozo left
the task of distinguishing “inducement” from “coercion” to later common law development, yet suggested that this line would be crossed
if Congress tried to compel states to legislate on a subject that was
not of truly national concern but rather fell within the states’
exclusive constitutional orbit.91
Four Justices dissented. Two maintained that the federal
unemployment compensation provisions, even if they did not technically “coerce[ ]” the states, nonetheless violated the Tenth Amendment by forcing states to surrender their exclusive reserved power
to administer their own tax laws.92 The other two Justices found
such coercion: Even if states theoretically were free to decide whether or not to participate in the SSA’s unemployment “tax and credit”
program, realistically states had to do so because otherwise they
would needlessly expose their citizens to the burden of both federal
and state taxes for the same basic benefit.93
In the companion case of Helvering v. Davis, the Court upheld the
SSA provisions taxing employers and employees to ensure retirement benefits.94 In his majority opinion, Justice Cardozo stressed
that Congress had great discretion in deciding that a matter fell

90. Id. at 590-91.
91. See id.; see also id. at 593-98 (concluding that the SSA did not require states to
unconstitutionally relinquish their essential reserved powers, as states retained a wide range
of discretion in complying with the federal statute—as long as they met the baseline
standards that Congress deemed essential—and could opt out anytime and give up the federal
credit).
92. See id. at 609-16 (Sutherland, J., dissenting, joined by Van Devanter, J.).
93. See id. at 598-609 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 616-18 (Butler, J., dissenting).
94. 301 U.S. 619, 639-46 (1937).
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within the “general Welfare,”95 particularly because that concept
was dynamic rather than static: “Needs that were narrow or
parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the wellbeing of the Nation.”96 He concluded that Congress had reasonably
found, based on abundant evidence, that the problem of income
insecurity in old age was “plainly national” and that “laws of the
separate states cannot deal with it effectively” because any state
that did so unilaterally would be competitively handicapped.97
Once again, Cardozo endorsed generous, but not absolute, federal
power. Unfortunately, his key proposed limit—that Congress could
“encourage[ ]” but not “coerce[ ]” states98—proved to be toothless.
The Court never seriously engaged in Cardozo’s recommended
common law elaboration of this distinction, which depended chiefly
on whether or not the regulated subject was “national” (in the sense
that states acting individually could not competently address it).99
Instead, for nearly eight decades the Court approved all taxing and
spending laws, even those that seemed to compel states to accept
federal regulation of matters that had always been left to the states
and could still be capably managed by them.100
C. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress “[a]ll legislative
Powers”101 to make, amend, or repeal laws that reflect majoritarian
preferences.102 Conversely, Article II grants the President alone all
95. See id. at 640 (“The discretion [to determine the ‘general Welfare’] belongs to
Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment.”); id. at 644-45. This astoundingly weak standard of judicial review is in tension
with Cardozo’s other insight that courts should not permit Congress to interfere with subjects
that the Constitution reserves to the states and which they can competently address
independently. See supra notes 85-87, 90-91 and accompanying text, infra notes 99, 193, 25865 and accompanying text.
96. Davis, 301 U.S. at 641.
97. Id. at 644. But see id. at 646 (McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that the
SSA retirement benefits provisions contravened the Tenth Amendment).
98. Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 585-91.
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. See infra Part III.B.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
102. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 746, 808, 823, 829-31 (2001) (tracing the historical
development of the concept of “legislative power”).
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“executive Power”103 to administer and enforce federal law.104
Articles I and II delineate a basic separation-of-powers structure
that led the Court to proclaim: “That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution.”105
Of course, Congress’s ability to pass all laws “necessary and
proper” to carry into effect the federal government’s powers106 means
that Congress can organize the executive branch—with the number,
structure, and jurisdiction of executive departments and agencies
left to Congress’s judgment. Yet it would not be “proper” for
Congress to delegate its distinctively “legislative” power to (1) make
normative policy choices that are important enough to its statutory
scheme that only Congress should make them, and (2) write laws
with sufficient specificity such that the executive branch can
understand what is being prescribed and voters can evaluate their
representatives.107 Accordingly, the Court insisted that the Constitution required Congress to articulate its particular policy and to “lay
down ... an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”108
This nondelegation doctrine came under severe pressure during
the 1930s, when Congress enacted many statutes that announced
general policy goals and gave executive agencies vast discretion to
promulgate and administer detailed implementing regulations.109
Constitutional attacks on such delegations succeeded in a pair of
1935 cases, but Justice Cardozo rendered separate opinions
approving the use of this tool within reasonable limits.110
First, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court struck down
Section 9(c) of the NIRA, which authorized the President to criminally prohibit interstate transportation of petroleum and its
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
104. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 416-17, 430-31 (1996).
105. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
107. See supra notes 10, 101-02 and accompanying text; see also Gary Lawson, The Rise
and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239-40 (1994).
108. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
109. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991).
110. See infra notes 111-27 and accompanying text.
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byproducts that had been produced in excess of a state’s production
quota (deemed “hot oil”).111 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Hughes held that Congress had run afoul of the Constitution’s
system of government by delegating its legislative power, yet failing
to expressly declare its policies and define a rule or standard to
cabin the President’s exercise of discretion.112
In a solo dissent, Justice Cardozo agreed that a valid delegation
required a “reasonably clear” limiting standard, but he inferred one
from the statute “considered as a whole.”113 Initially, he noted that
Section 9(c) restricted the President to a specific act—forbidding the
interstate shipment of petroleum that exceeded state production
restrictions—rather than either (1) granting him a “roving commission to inquire into evils [in the oil business] and then, upon
discovering them, [to] do anything he pleases,” or (2) allowing him
“to roam at will among all the possible subjects of interstate transportation.”114 Cardozo further argued that other sections of the statute supplied the necessary standard: The President could ban the
transportation of “hot oil” only when he determined, based on industry conditions, that doing so would effectuate Congress’s declared general purposes (removing obstacles to interstate commerce,
eliminating unfair business practices, promoting optimal use of
natural resources, stabilizing prices, reviving industry, and reducing
unemployment).115 Consequently, Cardozo maintained that “[d]iscretion is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.”116
More generally, he rejected formalism by declaring that
the separation of powers between the Executive and Congress is
not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigor.
There must be sensible approximation ... [and] elasticity of
adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of government, which cannot foresee today the developments of tomorrow
in their nearly infinite variety.117
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See 293 U.S. 388, 406, 418 (1935).
Id. at 414-30.
Id. at 434 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 435-39.
Id. at 440.
Id.
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After reviewing many legislative and judicial precedents dating
back to 1794 that authorized delegations, Justice Cardozo concluded:
There is no fear that the nation will drift from its ancient
moorings as the result of the narrow delegation of power
permitted by this section. What can be done under ... that
permission is closely and clearly circumscribed both as to subject
matter and occasion. The statute was framed in the shadow of
a national disaster. A host of unforeseen contingencies would
have to be faced from day to day, and faced with a ful[l]ness of
understanding unattainable by any one except the man upon the
scene. The President was chosen to meet the instant need.118

Finally, Cardozo proposed that courts should presume the lawfulness of a President’s action taken pursuant to a legitimate congressional delegation, except in the extremely rare situation (not present
here) where his conduct is shown to be irrational and arbitrary.119
Second, in Schechter the Court struck down the NIRA provision
authorizing the President to promulgate “fair competition” codes for
all industries.120 This provision not only overleapt the bounds of the
Commerce Clause,121 but also unconstitutionally delegated Congress’s essential “legislative Power[ ]” by failing to establish any
rules or standards concerning “fair competition” that would limit
the President’s discretion.122 Justice Cardozo concurred separately
to explain that, unlike the statutory provision in Panama Refining,
here “an attempted delegation [was] not confined to any single act
nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference
to a standard. Here in effect [was] a roving commission to inquire
into evils and upon discovery correct them.”123 He stressed that
Congress could not give the President a blank check to regulate all
industry based on his notions of fairness124: “This is delegation
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 443-44.
See id. at 444-48.
See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-51 (1935).
See id. at 542-50; supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529-42.
Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
See id. at 552-53.
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running riot. No such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer.”125
In sum, the Court in the mid-1930s manifested hostility to
Congress’s delegation of its legislative power.126 By contrast, Justice
Cardozo realized that such delegations were necessary to the functioning of the fledgling administrative state, but sought to ensure
that Congress enacted laws that covered a particular subject area
and that articulated true legal standards which directed and
hemmed in the executive branch’s range of action.127
Even Cardozo’s modest efforts at containing legislative delegations, however, did not long endure. The FDR appointees quickly
eviscerated the nondelegation doctrine, which has never again been
invoked to strike down a federal statute.128
III. REVIVING CARDOZO’S “BROAD BUT LIMITED” APPROACH TO
FEDERAL POWER, WITH A NEO-FEDERALIST TWIST
Justice Cardozo became incapacitated in late 1937 and passed
away the following July.129 Most of his colleagues either died or
retired between 1937 and 1943.130 President Roosevelt seized this
unique opportunity to reshape the Court.131 His nine appointees
were not seasoned judges like Cardozo who sought to apply legal
standards on a case-by-case basis to ensure muscular, but still
bounded, federal power.132 Rather, FDR chose politicians and law
professors who enthusiastically supported the New Deal, and they
quickly embraced total judicial deference to liberal economic and
social welfare legislation.133
These Democratic Justices rationalized their results by concocting doctrines that had little-to-no discernible basis in the Constitution’s text, structure, drafting and ratification history, or understandings shared by all three federal branches during America’s
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 553.
See supra notes 110-12, 120-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-19, 123-25 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.
See KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 566-67.
See LEUCHTENBURG , supra note 13, at 154-56, 210-12, 220.
Id. at 154-55, 162, 210-12, 220.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-15, 61, 99-100, 128 and accompanying text.
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first century-and-a-half.134 Nonetheless, this novel precedent eventually took root, and the Warren and Burger Courts repeatedly
rubber-stamped groundbreaking and expansive federal statutes in
areas such as civil rights, Medicare, and environmental law.135
This bedrock case law has created a quandary for conservative
Republican Justices, who attained a majority in the late 1980s.136
On the one hand, they are ideologically inclined to “conserve”
history and tradition—and thus to adhere to stare decisis, especially
on issues of government powers that have generated settled expectations.137 On the other hand, the conservatives treat the Constitution itself as law, and therefore attempt to interpret and apply
its language and structure as historically understood.138
The conservative Justices have been unable to reconcile post1936 precedent with the original Constitution, so they have adopted
an awkward compromise.139 They invariably parrot the Federalist
tenet that the federal government is limited to its enumerated
powers, with all others reserved to the states.140 But this abstract
principle rarely yields practical results, as the Court has imposed
only a few weak limits—and even those are not derived from
134. See LEUCHTENBURG , supra note 13, at 154; Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 79-85
(analyzing the main cases).
135. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 86-88 (discussing illustrative decisions).
136. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 600-01 (5th
ed. 2009) (noting that this new conservative majority faced the challenge of translating its
commitment to traditional federalism into workable judicial doctrine).
137.
[S]tare decisis exerts real force in certain areas, especially if the seminal
decision has been widely accepted and reaffirmed over a time period lengthy
enough that reversing course would exact serious costs in terms of legal
stability, continuity, and governmental legitimacy. Obvious examples include
the Court’s New Deal-era judgments endorsing the modern administrative-social
welfare state and Warren Court cases like Brown [v. Board of Education] and
Baker [v. Carr].
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common Law,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 524 n.24 (2008). Although the Justices display varying
degrees of commitment to stare decisis, and although some of them would happily overturn
cases such as Roe v. Wade, a few moderate Republican Justices have kept liberal precedents
largely intact. See id. at 521-27, 577-78.
138. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION : FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9-13, 37-47 (1997).
139. See examples of such opinions infra notes 153-76, 192-220, 271-74 and accompanying
text.
140. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533-38 (2012).
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historical constitutional materials, but rather from a distorted
reading of cases between 1937 and 1994.
Unfortunately, the conservative Justices have failed to pursue indepth historical analyses that could have justified the results in
many (although not all) of these cases.141 Accordingly, these Justices
need not continue to twist precedent to glean previously unnoticed
“limits” and then further tweak them from case to case. In this
regard, it is worth remembering that such a common law method,
which Cardozo employed to permanently reshape the law of
contracts and torts,142 did not yield similar success for him in
establishing enduring constitutional restraints on federal power.143
Instead, the conservative Justices should set forth and consistently apply legal rules, rooted in the Constitution’s text as historically understood, that would permit the sort of generous yet
bounded power that Cardozo endorsed. My proposed “Neo-Federalist” approach would clarify the Court’s jurisprudence on the
Commerce Clause, the Taxing and Spending Power, and the
nondelegation doctrine.144
A. The Commerce Clause
1. Modern Case Law
Shortly after Justice Cardozo died, the Court jettisoned the limits
it had announced in Jones & Laughlin Steel and permitted application of the NLRA to any employer, however small and local, if its
workers’ labor disputes might disrupt interstate commerce.145
Subsequent decisions suggested that the Court would acquiesce to
all Commerce Clause legislation. For example, in 1941, the Court
sustained enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act against a
little Georgia lumber company146 and labeled the Tenth Amendment

141. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2, and III.C.
142. See, e.g., KAUFMAN , supra note 4, at 243-360.
143. See supra Part II.
144. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing the Neo-Federalist
methodology).
145. See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604-09 (1939); see also supra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text (discussing Jones & Laughlin Steel).
146. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108-09, 113-25 (1941).
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a mere “truism” that did not independently constrain Congress’s
power.147
The next year, Wickard v. Filburn upheld the extension of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to a humble farmer for growing
an admittedly “trivial” amount of wheat (slightly in excess of his
federally imposed quota) for home rather than commercial use.148
The Court invented the theory that Congress could “aggregate” the
activities of all such farmers across the country to justify its finding
of a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.149 As the Justices
well understood, virtually any activity, when added up nationally,
has such an impact.150
Wickard thereby unleashed nearly absolute federal power. For the
next half century, the Court rejected every challenge to Acts of
Congress passed under the Commerce Clause, even those that
reached seemingly noncommercial and local activities.151 Indeed, the
Court asserted that it would suffice if Congress might have had
some “rational basis” for concluding that an activity, considered in
the aggregate, “‘substantially affected’ interstate commerce,” regardless of whether Congress had made findings to demonstrate
this effect.152
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have been unwilling to
overrule this precedent, which has stymied their efforts to impose
meaningful originalist restrictions on the Commerce Clause. For
instance, in United States v. Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
four conservative colleagues struck down a 1990 federal criminal
law banning possession of a firearm near a school.153 This bare
majority held that when Congress legislated in an area of “traditional state concern” (such as crime or education), the “substantial
effects” test would be applied rigorously if Congress sought to reach
activities that were not “commercial,” either of themselves or as “an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”154 The
Court declined to define “commerce,” declared that its meaning
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 123-24.
317 U.S. 111, 114-15, 118-28 (1942).
Id. at 127-30, 133.
See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 82.
See id. at 83-86 (analyzing the relevant cases).
Id. at 86-88.
514 U.S. 549, 551, 556-68 (1995).
Id. at 561.
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would instead be determined on a “case-by-case” basis, and made
the conclusory assertion that mere possession of a gun did not
constitute “commerce.”155 The Chief Justice recognized that this
common law approach would produce some “uncertainty,”156 but
insisted that such line drawing was necessary to maintain the
historical “distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local” and thereby preserve the Constitution’s structure
founded upon a limited federal government.157
Chief Justice Rehnquist manipulated post-1936 precedent. Most
importantly, the Court had always deferred to Congress’s judgment
that a particular activity (specifically including gun possession)
“substantially affected” interstate commerce, regardless of whether
the activity itself was “commercial.”158 In fact, after 1937, the Court
abandoned its previous attempts to confine Congress to regulating
only (1) “commerce,” defined as the sale of goods and transportation
services, and (2) subjects deemed “interstate” or “national,” as
opposed to inherently “local” matters that states had traditionally
regulated (such as labor and agriculture).159
More generally, the Lopez majority made two fundamental, and
related, mistakes. First, trying to work out the meaning of “commerce” on an ad hoc basis, rather than through a fixed definition,
invites arbitrary judgments.160 Second, Lopez harkens back to
Justice Cardozo’s common law assessments as to whether a particular statute reached activity (even noncommercial) that was
“local” or “national,” which depended largely on whether the activity
had a “close,” “direct,” and “substantial” impact on interstate commerce.161 Such fine distinctions have become increasingly difficult
to draw because changes in technology, transportation, and communications have created an interdependent society in which it is
155. Id. at 561-62.
156. Id. at 566.
157. Id. at 567-68.
158. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 79-88. Most pertinently, the Court had held
that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to ban possession of guns (by ex-felons). See
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 563-64, 568-77 (1977).
159. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 68-71 (summarizing pre-1937 cases adopting
this crabbed definition of “commerce”); id. at 79-83 (describing later precedent rejecting this
approach).
160. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit
Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 331-32 (2005).
161. See supra notes 50, 54-60 and accompanying text.
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nearly impossible to gauge the effects of any isolated activity on the
interstate economy.162 The upshot is that judicially enforceable restrictions must be based on a workable definition of “commerce,” not
on whether an activity exerts a “substantial” and “direct” effect on
interstate commerce.163
Despite the shortcomings of Lopez, it was applied by the same five
conservative Justices in United States v. Morrison to invalidate
Congress’s creation of a federal tort action for victims of gendermotivated violence.164 The Court ruled that Congress had interfered
with “traditional state concerns” (tort and criminal law) and that
sexual assault could not rationally be characterized as “commercial” activity or as “substantially affecting” interstate commerce.165
In Gonzales v. Raich, however, Justices Scalia and Kennedy
deserted their three conservative comrades and joined the liberals
in holding that Congress could criminalize the noncommercial and
intrastate growth, possession, and use of marijuana for medical
purposes, even though California had authorized these activities
pursuant to its traditional police powers over criminal law and
health care.166 While the Court did not overrule Lopez or Morrison,167 it was unwilling to apply the constitutional limits announced in those cases to strike down a long-established and
important federal law.168 Thus, Raich appears to have cabined Lopez
and Morrison to new, and largely symbolic, statutes that effectively duplicate existing state laws.169
Of similarly marginal likely impact is National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius.170 In that case, Chief Justice
Roberts authored a solo opinion, which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito joined in the part that rejected Congress’s
assertion of power under the Commerce Clause to impose an
“individual mandate” (IM) on uninsured Americans to purchase
162. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 11-12, 49, 110-12.
163. See id. at 9.
164. 529 U.S. 598, 601-19 (2000).
165. See id. at 615-18.
166. 545 U.S. 1, 25-33 (2005).
167. See id. at 23-26 (differentiating Raich from Lopez and Morrison).
168. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880-85, 900-13 (2005).
169. See id. at 882.
170. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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health insurance, as required by the Affordable Care Act (ACA).171
This slender majority held that Congress could regulate only preexisting commercial “activity”—as contrasted with forcing people to
engage in commerce by buying something they did not want.172 The
Court crafted this “activity versus inactivity” distinction by cleverly
repackaging a few words used in previous cases.173 In any event,
prohibiting Congress from regulating “inactivity” will have almost
no real-world legal teeth because the IM represents the only time
Congress has ever invoked the Commerce Clause to compel inactive
Americans to purchase something, and no similar statutes have
been enacted or proposed.174
Overall, the Court improvised the “substantial effects” and “aggregation” standards for the sole purpose of sustaining the New
Deal, and they proved to be worthless in checking federal power for
nearly six decades.175 Unsurprisingly, the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts have failed in their efforts to mine this precedent to unearth
principled limits on Congress.176 The Lopez/Morrison “commerce”
requirement lost steam within a decade, and the National Federation prohibition on regulating “inactivity” will have negligible
practical force. Therefore, the conservative Justices should consider
a fresh approach.

171. See id. at 547-61 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 649-69 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (agreeing with this Commerce Clause holding, but not with Roberts’s further
conclusion that the IM could be sustained under the Taxing Power).
172. See id. at 549-58 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 647-60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
173. The Court cited cases reciting that Congress could regulate “commercial activity.” See
id. at 549-54, 556-58 (Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 647-48, 652-57 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
& Alito, JJ., dissenting). Those opinions, however, contrasted “commercial” with
“noncommercial” activity—not “activity” with “inactivity” (for the obvious reason that none
of the challenged statutes purported to reach inactivity). See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
ObamaCare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying Historical Limits
on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1747-48.
174. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., & Grant S. Nelson, The Likely Impact of National
Federation on Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 979-80, 985-87, 990-91,
995-96, 1000 (2013).
175. See supra Part III.A.1.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 153-74.
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2. The Neo-Federalist Alternative
The Commerce Clause’s text and history support a two-part legal
inquiry.177 First, Congress can only regulate “commerce,” defined as
“the voluntary sale or exchange of property ... and all accompanying
market-based activities, enterprises, relationships, and interests.”178
Second, such commerce must be “among the several States” (that is,
either cross state lines or occur in one state but have some discernible impact in at least one other state).179 Such interstate effects are
pervasive in our integrated national economy, so the domain of
completely internal commerce that each state can competently
regulate has shrunk dramatically.180 Hence, the threshold “commerce” requirement is usually dispositive.
Application of this two-step test would result in sustaining most
Commerce Clause legislation, but through a straightforward
application of precise legal rules grounded in that Clause—as
contrasted with the Court’s convoluted use of flexible standards
cobbled together over the years. To illustrate, Congress can regulate
as “commerce” (1) the sale of goods and their production through
manufacturing, farming, mining, and general labor—as well as the
environmental and safety incidents of those activities; (2) business
services such as commercial transportation, banking, insurance, and
public accommodations (including antitrust and antidiscrimination
laws designed to ensure a free market in those services); and (3)
crimes that entail the voluntary sale of goods (such as illegal drugs)
or services (such as gambling, loan sharking, and prostitution).181
The foregoing approach, while broad, demarcates certain clear
boundaries. For example, although “commerce” includes production
intended for the marketplace, it cannot be stretched to encompass
production to fulfill personal or household needs, such as the growth
177. Grant Nelson and I applied this Neo-Federalist approach to the Commerce Clause in
a book-length article. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 8-9; see also Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96
NW . U. L. REV. 695 (2002) (defending our thesis against the claim that this Clause limited
Congress to regulating only the sale and transportation of goods).
178. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 9; see also id. at 107-10 (elaborating upon this
definition).
179. Id. at 10-11, 110-11.
180. Id. at 10-11, 110.
181. Id. at 9-12, 107-13, 119-27, 136-52, 158-63 (discussing illustrative cases).
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of wheat in Wickard or marijuana in Raich.182 Likewise, although
the sale of guns or drugs constitutes “commerce,” mere possession
of such items without the intent to sell does not.183 Consequently,
the Court reached the correct result in Lopez, but not Raich.184
Similarly, “commerce” includes only “voluntary” market transactions185—not the compelled purchase of health insurance involved
in National Federation.186 Finally, the Commerce Clause and the
Constitution’s basic federalist structure bar Congress from interfering with noncommercial matters of exclusively moral, social, or
cultural concern (such as the crime and tort of gender-based assault
considered in Morrison).187
In short, application of the Neo-Federalist methodology would
yield the same result as in most of the Court’s major post-1936
cases, but through consistent application of defined legal principles.
Those rules would, however, establish certain fixed limits on
Congress’s power—most notably, by prohibiting statutes that
purport to cover activities that are not “commerce,” such as violent
crimes or the mere possession of items.
B. The Taxing and Spending Power
1. The Court’s Blind Deference to Congress
After 1937, and especially since the Great Society of the 1960s,
Congress has exercised its power to tax and spend for the “general
Welfare” to exponentially proliferate grants-in-aid to state and local
governments, conditioned on their compliance with federal standards.188 Although in theory states can choose to forego federal
funding and not cooperate with any federal program, in practice
political and economic considerations invariably lead states to
accept these schemes because otherwise they will not receive their
See Pushaw, supra note 168, at 885, 909-10, 913-14.
See id. at 909-13.
See id. at 896, 913-14.
See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 9, 107.
See Pushaw, supra note 173, at 1751-52.
See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 10-12, 21, 27, 41, 78, 109-10.
See JAMES L. BUCKLEY, SAVING CONGRESS FROM ITSELF: EMANCIPATING THE STATES &
EMPOWERING THEIR PEOPLE 48-49, 55-56 (2014); see also id. at xi (noting that funding for such
federal programs had exploded from $24 billion in 1970 to an estimated $641 billion in 2015).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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proportional share of federal money derived from federal taxes that
their citizens have already paid.189
This extensive congressional legislation has facilitated a federal
takeover of subjects that states and their subdivisions are fully
capable of handling, such as operating city and county schools,
roads, and public safety departments.190 Obeying detailed, rigid
federal rules and mandates has imposed a huge burden on state and
local governments because those governments (1) incur massive
administrative costs, (2) cannot address local problems in more
suitable, innovative, and efficient ways, and (3) cannot truly
represent their constituents, who often cannot figure out whether
state or federal officials are responsible for the wastefulness and
other flaws of such programs.191
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that such taxing and
spending statutes might at some point violate “federalism,” but has
rejected every constitutional attack on them (with one recent and
extraordinarily narrow exception).192 Most pertinently, the Court
189. See id. at xii, 6-7, 16-17. The only major exception to such state submission has been
the Affordable Care Act, as twenty-one states declined offers of full federal funding for medical
insurance expenditures during the first three years because they calculated that any benefits
would eventually be outweighed by the costs—years of onerous federal regulation, gradually
decreasing payments, and the inability to respond effectively to their citizens’ health care
needs. Id. at 17-18.
190. See id. at xi, 6-7, 9-11. Although there are countless inappropriate federal projects, my
favorites are fixing a one-lane bridge in rural Connecticut and beautifying a tiny Kansas town.
Id. at 9-11.
191. See id. at xi-xii, 9-16, 19-47, 53-56, 58-59, 62-63. Conversely, Congress’s focus on such
local concerns has diverted its attention from tasks that it alone can address, such as foreign
affairs and ballooning federal deficits. Id. at xi, xiv, 47-53, 59, 63. The concrete positive results
of such runaway federal spending on local matters such as education have been either
nonexistent or negligible, with the largest percentage of money being wasted on compliance
costs. Id. at 13-16, 19-26.
Buckley, a former United States Senator and D.C. Circuit judge, proposes abolishing all
federal grant-in-aid programs, with block grants to states phased out over five years to enable
their governments to adjust. Id. at xvi, 57-64. However, members of Congress have little
political incentive to take this radical step, as the current system enables them to take credit
for attending to their constituents’ most immediate concerns (such as crime, education, and
local roads), while shifting accountability for any problems with such laws to state and local
governments. Id. at 30. Accordingly, I believe that only the Supreme Court, which is
independent of direct political pressure and sworn to uphold the Constitution, can reverse this
situation.
192. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision: How Can the
Federal Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1993, 2019-33 (2013)
(analyzing this precedent). A landmark case suggesting that such “federalism” restrictions
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has rendered Justice Cardozo’s “inducement versus coercion”
distinction meaningless by ignoring his observation that “coercion”
exists where Congress pressures states to accept federal funding on
matters that have always been entrusted to—and can still be
competently addressed by—the states acting individually and that
Congress has no constitutional power to regulate directly.193
The Court’s total abdication became transparent in South Dakota
v. Dole, which sustained a federal law that withheld 5 percent of
states’ highway funding if they did not raise their minimum alcoholdrinking age to twenty-one.194 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist breezily dismissed the dissenters’ argument that the
Twenty-First Amendment authorizes states alone to control
“intoxicating liquors,”195 and that therefore Congress cannot condition a grant in a way that abridges this exclusive state power.196
The Court then identified three other Spending Clause “limitations,”197 but they proved to be merely theoretical.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that expenditures
could only be for “the general Welfare,” yet stressed the Court’s previous extreme deference to Congress198 and cited with approval a
1976 case questioning whether “general Welfare” was “a judicially
were more rhetorical than real was Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1947) (holding that the Tenth Amendment did not prohibit Congress from withholding
federal money unless states complied with the condition that their officials refrain from
engaging in certain political activities, and thus sustaining a federal order to remove a state
official).
193. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 624-33 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that since 1937, the Court had
never deemed a federal statute to unconstitutionally “coerce” the states). Justice Cardozo
indicated that “coercion” could be found when Congress relied on the Spending Power as a
pretext to take over areas that the states could regulate on their own. See Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590-98 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937); see also
supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
194. 483 U.S. 203, 206-12 (1987).
195. Id. at 205 n.1 (“Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: ‘The transportation
of or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.’”).
196. See id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 218 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). With no
supporting authority, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Court’s previous statement
that there could be an “independent constitutional bar” on the Spending Power simply meant
that Congress could not attempt to induce states to take actions that “would themselves be
unconstitutional,” such as “invidious[ ] discrimina[tion].” Id. at 210-11 (majority opinion).
197. Id. at 207-08.
198. Id. at 207 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41).
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enforceable restriction at all.”199 Not surprisingly, the Court yielded
to Congress’s judgment that the “general Welfare” would be
furthered by a national solution to the interstate highway problems
caused by different state drinking ages.200 As Justice O’Connor
emphasized in her dissent, though, judicial surrender to Congress’s
“notion of the general welfare” allows it to assume general parliamentary power and destroy the states’ reserved jurisdiction.201 In
this instance, Congress’s purported concern for reducing interstate
highway accidents barely disguised its true goal: regulating underage alcohol use throughout the country.
Second, the Chief Justice recognized that conditions on a federal
grant might be illegitimate if they were not reasonably related to
the United States government’s interest in a national project or
program.202 However, the Court found that the condition here (raising the legal drinking age) logically related to the federal interest in
safe interstate travel.203 Justice O’Connor disputed this conclusion
because eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds (1) would be barred from
drinking even if they were not about to drive across a state border,
and (2) were only a small part of America’s drunk driving problem.204 She chided the majority for permitting Congress to “regulate
almost any area of a State’s social, political, or economic life on the
theory that use of the interstate transportation system is somehow
enhanced.”205
Third, the Court reiterated that Congress could not “coerc[e]”
states, but held that this statute had merely “encourage[d]” them
because 5 percent was relatively small206 (albeit without indicating
what percentage or amount of lost funds would tip the scales).207
Relatedly, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that Congress’s clear
notice to the states that full federal highway funding depended upon
199. Id. at 207 n.2 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam)).
200. See id. at 208.
201. Id. at 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 207-08 (majority opinion).
203. See id. at 208-09.
204. Id. at 213-15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 215. Justice O’Connor added that the Spending Clause authorized Congress to
only specify how federal money should be spent, not to impose a regulation. Id. at 216-17.
206. Id. at 211-12 (majority opinion).
207. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So,
78 IND . L.J. 459, 464, 466-69, 532-33 (2003).
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increasing the drinking age underscored the voluntary nature of
their consent.208 The Court did not, however, explain why state legislators would ever freely refuse to accept any federal funding
generated by federal taxes that their citizens had already paid, and
then slap these constituents with an additional state tax to make up
for that loss to obtain the same benefit (such as highway maintenance and repair).
In short, the Dole “limitations” have no legal or practical bite.209
Remarkably, the Court caved in even though Congress had invoked
the Spending Clause to regulate a subject that the Constitution
expressly removes from the federal government’s domain.210 Dole
naturally led Congress to believe that this power was absolute, and
the Court reinforced that conclusion over the next quarter of a
century.211
In 2012, however, National Federation produced a small crack in
this brick wall of post-1936 precedent. The Court reaffirmed that
Congress’s authority to tax is virtually absolute,212 but finally found
an exercise of its power to spend to be “coercive.”213 As previously
mentioned, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the four other
Republican appointees that Congress could not enact the IM under
the Commerce or Necessary and Proper Clauses.214 Surprisingly,
however, he joined the four liberal Justices in holding that, despite
Congress’s explicit declaration that it was enacting the IM exaction
as a “penalty” to punish violations of its interstate commercial
regulation of health insurance, this charge could also be construed
208. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
209. See Baker & Berman, supra note 207, at 461-85. Perhaps most notably, the Court
failed to clarify whether “coercion” meant that a Spending Clause condition had to be accepted
because the state (1) otherwise would not survive as a government entity, (2) had “no fair
choice” because “the range of alternatives ... was unacceptably narrow as a normative matter,”
or (3) had only one objectively rational choice. Id. at 520-21.
210. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 218 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
211. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 631-44 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (summarizing the Court’s unbroken line of modern
precedent deferring to Congress’s exercise of the Spending Power).
212. See id. at 563-74 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 589, 623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.).
213. See id. at 575-85 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 674-89 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
214. See id. at 547-61 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 649-60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (discussing this holding).
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as a “tax” on those who did not buy insurance.215 This creative
statutory interpretation enabled the Court to sustain the IM under
Congress’s Taxing Power, which is essentially plenary.216 The Chief
Justice suggested that Congress could not constitutionally levy a
“tax” that was so high as to be in reality a “penalty,” but he did not
identify any specific tipping point.217
Of more relevance here, all of the Justices except Ginsburg and
Sotomayor unexpectedly struck down as “coercive” a different ACA
provision, which required states to either expand their Medicaid
programs to include millions of new low-income recipients or lose all
of their current Medicaid funding (not merely the new portion earmarked for the ACA).218 This total deprivation left states with no
realistic choice but to accept Congress’s terms, as Medicaid spending
consumed 20 percent of the average state’s budget and about $100
billion was at stake.219 Chief Justice Roberts contrasted such numbers with the 5 percent deprivation in Dole (amounting to a few million dollars), but pointedly declined to identify the percentage of
federal funds (or dollar figure) that Congress would have to withhold for “coercion” to be found.220
The ACA’s Medicaid expansion provision was unique in that it
threatened states with a complete forfeiture of their Medicaid
funding—a draconian measure never before attempted by Congress
and unlikely ever to be tried again.221 Thus, National Federation will
have almost no effect on the many other conditional spending
215. See Nat’l Fed’n, 567 U.S. at 561-75 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 589, 623 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.).
216. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking
the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121, 125-27, 195-205
(2016) (arguing that the Court’s reading of the IM could not be justified under established
principles of statutory interpretation and hence must have reflected raw political pragmatism).
217. See Nat’l Fed’n, 567 U.S. at 572-73 (Roberts, C.J.).
218. See id. at 575-86 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 648, 671-89
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and his four liberal
colleagues softened the blow of this holding by permitting Congress to offer the states a fresh
supply of Medicaid funds to induce them to voluntarily comply with the new ACA conditions.
See id. at 585-88 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); accord id. at 626, 645-46
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Sotomayor, J.).
219. See id. at 576-85 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 671-89 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
220. See id. at 580-85 (Roberts, C.J.).
221. See Pushaw, supra note 192, at 2038, 2042.
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programs that have so badly eroded state independence.222 Most
significantly, the Court has refused to define “coercion” and instead
has vaguely indicated that it falls somewhere between the 5 percent
threatened withholding in Dole (which amounted to less than 0.5
percent of the state’s total budget—a few million dollars) and the
100 percent involved in National Federation (which was 20 percent
of the typical state budget and could cost billions).223 The Court has
thereby left Congress and lower federal judges adrift in evaluating the constitutionality of the many statutes that fall between
these extremes.224 When litigation over such laws reaches the Supreme Court, it has complete discretion to determine whether Congress has crossed the imaginary line separating “encouragement”
from “coercion.”
The Court, then, has abandoned serious judicial review of Congress’s exercise of its power to tax and spend for the general welfare.
By contrast, a Neo-Federalist methodology can supply legal principles that would restore restraints on Congress. As we shall see,
this approach provides historical support for Justice Cardozo’s crucial insight that Congress cannot constitutionally interfere with
subjects that states, acting separately, are competent to regulate.225
2. Some Neo-Federalist Limitations
Political constraints on Congress’s power under the Taxing and
Spending Clauses226 do not imply the absence of legal ones. Rather,
my earlier examination of the original meaning of each Clause reveals certain legal boundaries that can still be judicially enforced
today.227

222. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
223. See Nat’l Fed’n, 567 U.S. at 580-85.
224. See id. at 642-44 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (decrying
this arbitrariness); Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Roberts’s Individual Mandate: The
Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW . U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 29-30 (2013).
225. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590-91, 593-98 (1937).
226. Obviously, voters will not support taxes above a certain level. See United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (noting that the statute at issue explicitly laid a “tax” and
concluding that “[t]he remedy for excessive taxation is in the hands of Congress, not the
courts”).
227. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.

974

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:937

To its credit, Congress has almost always respected the textual
limits in the Taxing Clause itself by (1) levying “taxes,” as contrasted with “penalties,” (2) imposing indirect taxes (duties, imposts, and
excises) uniformly, and (3) apportioning direct taxes among the
states based on their population.228 Thus, in the rare instances when
Congress oversteps these bright lines, the Court can candidly say so
with very little disruption of federal fiscal policy.
That is why the Court’s failure to check Congress in National
Federation was so misguided. The ACA refers to the IM exaction
eighteen times as a regulatory “penalty” (and never as a “tax”), and
Congress and the President repeatedly assured Americans that it
was not a tax.229 Chief Justice Roberts’s rewriting of the IM charge
as a “tax” (with the approval of four colleagues) destroyed the critical restraint on the Taxing Power: the political fact that voters will
hold Congress accountable for unwanted tax increases, which is the
main justification for judicial deference in this area.230 Moreover,
even assuming that this indefensible statutory interpretation were
correct, the IM “tax” was “direct” and hence had to be allocated
based on population, and this bedrock requirement was not met.231
In short, National Federation countenances absolute congressional power under the Taxing Clause. Instead, the Court should have
adopted the Neo-Federalist view that this authority is broad but
subject to a few minimal limits—namely, those contained expressly in the Clause itself.
Similarly, the Court should interpret the Spending Clause as imposing certain restrictions. Two items in this Clause have always
been clear: paying America’s debts and providing for the national
defense.232 Rather, debate has centered on the phrase “the general

228. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
229. See Pushaw, supra note 192, at 2026-28 (making this point and marshaling massive
evidence showing that the IM charge could plausibly be interpreted only as a regulatory
“penalty,” not a “tax”).
230. See id. at 1996, 2028-30, 2042-43 (maintaining that political accountability can be
ensured only if the Court reasonably construes statutory “penalties” as such, instead of
relabeling them as “taxes” years after a statute is enacted and thereby enabling Congress to
evade responsibility).
231. See id. at 2029-30 (setting forth this “direct tax” argument and adding that the
Constitution allows Congress to tax only the purchase of products (such as cigarettes), not the
failure to buy things).
232. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Welfare.”233 The Court settled the main historical dispute in 1936:
Congress can spend to promote anything that serves the national
interest (Hamilton’s position), and therefore is not limited to
achieving the aims contained in Article I’s seventeen other enumerated powers (Madison’s conception).234 Alas, the Court has explicitly
declined to set forth any legal rules to determine whether a subject
falls within the “general” welfare (that is, the national interest), as
contrasted with matters of “local” welfare committed to the states.235
This abdication of judicial review has resulted in the unchecked
explosion of federal spending legislation that began with the New
Deal, especially grants-in-aid to states with strings attached.236
From a purely historical standpoint, the gigantic modern administrative and social welfare state is unconstitutional,237 as the
Framers and Ratifiers contemplated a small federal government
maintained by low spending, with autonomous states retaining the
vast bulk of regulatory power.238
Yet Neo-Federalism acknowledges that the Founders’ subjective
expectations are not controlling, for two reasons. First, the Constitution enshrines a phrase—“general Welfare”—which can encompass
matters that in 1787 concerned only state governments, but that
have gradually become interstate problems of federal interest
because of economic and social changes (particularly advances in
technology and transportation).239 Second, from a pragmatic standpoint, our current governmental system cannot be dismantled
because legal, political, economic, and social chaos would result.240
These two considerations, however, do not dictate the conclusion
that the “general Welfare” provision grants Congress absolute (as
opposed to broad) power and that it is thus futile to try to fashion
reasonable limits based on timeless constitutional principles.

233. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
235. Indeed, the Court has questioned whether any such judicially enforceable legal
standards are possible. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 & n.2 (1987).
236. See supra notes 100, 188-93 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 107, at 1231-54 (arguing that the post-New Deal federal
government cannot be reconciled with the Constitution’s original public meaning).
238. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
240. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 44, at 6, 8, 101-02, 173.
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No constitutional precept is more fundamental than federalism:
The states and “We the People”241 retain all government power,
except for a few enumerated powers entrusted to the federal government.242 In analyzing the Spending Clause, the conservative
Justices invariably have highlighted this federalism principle.243
Unfortunately, they have then applied a flexible “coercion” analysis
that cannot possibly safeguard the states’ reserved powers—indeed,
that has allowed Congress since the New Deal to browbeat states
into subservience.244
The brute reality is that Congress’s conditional grants to states
are inevitably coercive. State officials cannot reasonably be expected to refuse their share of federal funds, then make up the difference by increasing state taxes to get the same benefit.245 Because
such double taxation is political and economic poison, states will
invariably yield to Congress’s demands. Ultimately, the only real
question is the degree of coercion, not the red herring of trying to
distinguish “encouragement” from “coercion.”246
The Court has permitted Congress to force states to carry out
federal regulatory and social welfare programs. This system has
eviscerated state autonomy247 and has undercut political accountability because it is so difficult to ascertain whether the federal or
state government is responsible for any particular action.248 In
theory, then, the cleanest solution would be for the Court to
abandon its “coercion” touchstone and instead insist that Congress
implement its Spending Power laws exclusively through federal

241. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
242. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO . 32, supra note 67, at 199-200 (Alexander Hamilton);
THE FEDERALIST NO . 45, supra note 67, at 313 (James Madison).
243. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533-38, 552-55, 557, 55961, 577, 588 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 647-48, 653-60, 675-78, 691, 706-07 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
244. See supra notes 98-100, 188-211, 222-24 and accompanying text.
245. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 45.
246. See Pushaw, supra note 192, at 2040.
247. See Baker & Berman, supra note 207, at 469-85 (arguing that the Court should enforce
meaningful limits on the Spending Power to promote diverse approaches among the states to
problems within their constitutional competence, because such a legal regime will satisfy
more people—and hence increase aggregate social welfare—than will Congress’s imposition
of a uniform national policy).
248. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
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agencies. In practice, however, such a radical change seems exceedingly unlikely.
Stare decisis makes it similarly improbable that the Court will
discard an analysis (“encouragement” versus “coercion”) that it has
followed since 1937.249 Consequently, a more feasible recommendation would be for the Court to set forth specific legal guidelines
that can be applied to make this distinction. One possibility would
be to identify numerical amounts, in terms of both percentage and
dollars of funds withheld, that Congress cannot exceed without
being found to have “coerced” the states.250 Although such mathematical precision would have the salutary effect of sharply curtailing the discretion of judges (and Congress), it is a purely pragmatic
proposal that has no historical foundation.
By contrast, a Neo-Federalist approach yields a practical solution
that is rooted in the Constitution’s original meaning. Madison’s
Virginia Plan, the Constitutional Convention’s initial blueprint,
provided in Resolution VI that Congress can “legislate in all Cases
for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to
which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise
of individual [state] Legislation.”251 The Framers eventually moved
away from this grant of Parliament-style general legislative
authority and instead limited Congress to eighteen enumerated
powers, which left all powers not listed to the states or the People.252
For example, rather than authorizing Congress to govern anything
that occurred interstate, Article I restricted Congress to regulating
only “Commerce” (market-oriented activity) “among the several
States.”253 Likewise, the Framers did not empower Congress to
249. See supra notes 84-91, 98-100, 193, 206-09, 218-24 and accompanying text.
250. See Pushaw, supra note 192, at 2040. The Court could also pinpoint the maximum
percentage of the state’s budget that a federal program, which is threatened with a funding
cutoff, can consume. The Court has unhelpfully indicated that 0.5 percent is acceptable (Dole),
but 20 percent is not (National Federation). See supra notes 206-07, 218-24 and accompanying
text.
251. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 1966) (1787).
252. For an illuminating analysis of the Convention’s movement from general to
enumerated powers, see Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to
Resolve Collective Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123
(2012).
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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legislate for the “general Welfare,” but imposed the qualifications
that (1) Congress first had to levy a “tax” (and not, say, a “penalty”),
(2) “direct” taxes had to be apportioned by population, and (3) “indirect” taxes had to be uniform throughout America.254 Similarly,
Congress could not enact any bankruptcy or naturalization laws it
pleased, but instead had to ensure that they were “uniform ...
throughout the United States.”255
Although Resolution VI did not survive in the final Constitution
and therefore has no binding legal force, it remains useful in developing a workable definition for phrases such as “among the
States,” “general Welfare,” and “throughout the United States.”256
Most pertinently, “general Welfare” can most plausibly be interpreted to mean matters that are of truly “national” interest (that is,
affecting Americans collectively) or that states acting individually
are incompetent to address.257
Remarkably, Justice Cardozo discerned this basic federalism
principle even though he cited no historical authority for it (and apparently had never read the Convention records). His insight is
illustrated in his two opinions sustaining the Social Security Act’s
unemployment compensation and retirement benefits provisions.258
Justice Cardozo held that Congress had established through
abundant evidence that these employment problems were “national
in area and dimensions”259 and that “laws of the separate states
cannot deal with [the problems] effectively,”260 because any state
acting on its own could not provide such employee benefits without
254. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
256. To be clear, Resolution VI can help flesh out the meaning of constitutional phrases
such as “general Welfare” that refer to national and interstate issues. By contrast, that
Resolution should not be invoked to justify an expansive gloss on words such as “commerce”
and “taxes.” See Pushaw, supra note 173, at 1705-06, 1721-25.
257. Other scholars have made a similar argument. See, e.g., Baker & Berman, supra note
207, at 525-26; Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH . L. REV. 554, 555-56, 613 (1995).
My suggested interpretation finds further support in the very language of Article I, Section
8, Clause 1, which authorizes taxes for “the common Defence and general Welfare.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Obviously, military defense concerns the entire body politic and cannot
be handled by states.
258. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (unemployment); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (retirement); supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
259. Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586; see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644.
260. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644.
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placing itself at a severe competitive disadvantage.261 Accordingly,
Justice Cardozo concluded that Congress had merely “encouraged”
or “induce[d]” states to cooperate with the federal government in
resolving these common problems.262 Nonetheless, he cautioned that
Congress would cross the line into “coercion” if it laid a tax “upon
the condition that a state may escape its operation through the
adoption of a statute unrelated in subject matter to activities fairly
within the scope of national policy and power.”263
In short, Justice Cardozo did not contemplate that judges would
have untethered discretion to label a federal statute as either
“encouraging” or “coercing” state assent—much less that this
distinction would be a sham that would disguise absolute congressional power. Rather, he thought that this determination would
hinge on the question of whether Congress sought to govern a
subject of truly national concern that states, operating independently, were incapable of addressing.264 If the answer was no, the
statute would be struck down as a coercive invasion of an area
reserved by the Constitution to the states.265 Justice Cardozo’s
nuanced analysis almost perfectly captures the original meaning of
the phrase “general Welfare,” and thus provides an excellent NeoFederalist baseline.
The Court should revive the Cardozo test, which supplies a relatively simple and sensible benchmark for assessing the constitutionality of Spending Clause laws. Usually, such federal statutes clearly
fall on one side of the line or the other. For instance, Acts of Congress designed to remedy environmental problems are plainly “national” because pollution crosses state boundaries and cannot be
effectively addressed by the states acting on their own, owing to the
“race to the bottom” phenomenon that Cardozo identified in the
Social Security cases.266 Conversely, the Court should invalidate federal spending statutes that interfere with subjects that the Constitution commits to the states and that those governments and their
subdivisions can still competently handle separately. Examples
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586-89, 591; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641-44.
Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586, 589-91, 594-98; see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641-44.
Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590; id. at 591 (same).
See supra notes 84-91, 96-99, 193, 225, 251, 256-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-91, 98-99, 193, 225, 263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-91, 97-99, 258-63 and accompanying text.
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include city and county schools and police forces, almost all crimes,
and maintenance of local roads. Moreover, contrary to Dole, the
Court should never permit Congress to rely on the Spending Clause
to regulate a subject that the Constitution specifically entrusts to
the states alone, such as liquor control.267
In sum, the proposed Neo-Federalist/Cardozo test can typically
be applied in a straightforward manner. To be sure, hard cases will
arise, but that is always true. Such inevitable difficulty is not a reason for the Court to abandon principled legal analysis altogether.
C. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Although FDR’s appointees did not formally overrule the Panama
Refining/Schechter principle that Congress generally cannot delegate its “legislative Power[ ],”268 they swiftly drained this doctrine of
all practical force. Most notably, in 1943 the Court summarily rejected the claim that Congress, by authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to grant broadcast licenses in “the ‘public
interest,’” had set forth a standard so indefinite as to be unconstitutional.269
By allowing such a bottomless grant of discretion, the Court signaled that it would permit any delegation.270 Indeed, this total deference has continued unabated,271 despite then-Justice Rehnquist’s
267. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 111-28 and accompanying text (describing these two cases).
269. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
270. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What
legislated standard ... can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have
repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public interest’ standard?”).
271. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-74 (2001) (making this point,
and holding that the Clean Air Act did not unlawfully delegate power in instructing the EPA
to set air quality standards “requisite to protect public health” based on certain criteria). The
Court has acknowledged that Article II confines agencies to the “executive power” (carrying
into effect laws passed by Congress), rather than legislating by independently formulating
policy goals. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324-28 (2014).
Nevertheless, the Court has asserted that Congress can invoke the Necessary and Proper
Clause to “delineate[ ] the general policy,” enact “broad ... directives,” and seek assistance
from expert agencies to promulgate detailed regulations and take other actions to effectuate
the statute’s objectives. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-74; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 982 (3d ed. 2000) (contending that Congress cannot transfer
its core “legislative Power[ ]” to choose policy goals, but can delegate discretion to agencies to
select the best means to achieve those ends).
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attempt to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine in 1980.272 The
Court has even suggested that its basic test—that Congress must
articulate an “intelligible principle” to guide and limit executive
discretion—can never result in invalidation because statutes are
invariably written in such general terms, with so much room for
executive discretion in interpreting and implementing the legislative scheme, that legally principled judicial review is impossible.273
The Court apparently believes that serious application of the nondelegation doctrine would fatally disrupt the functioning of the
modern administrative state.274
Yet this conclusion is not necessarily true. The Court need not
make a stark choice between its pre-1937 antipathy to all delegations and its subsequent blessing of any delegation. Rather, Justice
Cardozo showed that a middle path could be charted. He quickly
grasped that the new federal regulatory regime required delegations, but insisted that Congress (1) make specific policy decisions
that targeted a particular subject area, and (2) set forth reasonably
clear legal standards that defined and confined the executive
branch’s range of action.275 To illustrate, he agreed with the Court
that Congress could not simply grant the President carte blanche to
promulgate “fair competition” codes for all industries and trades,276
272. In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980),
the Court allowed Congress’s delegation to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to “set the standard which most adequately and feasibly assures, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health.” Id. at
647. By contrast, Justice Rehnquist argued that this delegation was invalid because the
statutory provision gave the agency no indication as to where on the vast continuum of
relative safety it should fix the standard. Id. at 672-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment). More recently, Justice Thomas said that he would be “willing to address ...
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding
of separation of powers.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). No other Justice,
however, has expressed an interest in such a reconsideration.
273. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-75 (majority opinion). The Court’s unbroken eighty-two
year record of sustaining every federal statute challenged under the nondelegation doctrine
has reduced to mere rhetoric its frequent assertion that it has “long ... insisted that ‘the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’
mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
274. See Lawson, supra note 107, at 1241.
275. See supra notes 113-19, 123-25, 127 and accompanying text.
276. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551-53 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring); see also supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing
Schechter).
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but would have permitted delegating to the executive branch the
power to take a particular action (forbidding the shipment of “hot
oil”) based on the discretionary application of many factors.277
The Neo-Federalist approach builds on Cardozo’s basic insight,
but supplies a firmer foundation in the Constitution’s text, structure, and history. The applicable constitutional principles are so
fundamental that it is surprising the Court has so casually disregarded them.278 The Constitution creates a democracy in which
Congress and the President are accountable to the electorate, which
is possible only if “legislative” and “executive” powers remain distinct.279 Article I vests Congress alone with “[a]ll legislative Powers”—to enact prospective laws of general applicability that embody
the majority’s policy wishes.280 Therefore, statutes must be specific
and detailed enough to achieve two key purposes. First, citizens
must be able to know what the law prescribes (or proscribes) and to
determine if their policy preferences are being fulfilled. Second, the
President and his subordinates must understand how they are to
exercise their Article II “executive Power” to administer and enforce
federal law. Although Congress obviously can entrust the President
and other executive officials with some discretion (since they cannot
execute each provision of every statute with total vigor), their leeway cannot be infinite.
The Court’s “intelligible principle” standard has proved useless in
effectuating the foregoing basic constitutional tenets.281 It has enabled Congress to routinely declare vague but popular goals (with
attendant political gain), then delegate difficult policy choices to
executive bureaucrats—who can be blamed, but not face electoral
277. See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 434-44 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (analyzing Panama Refining).
278. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 498-500 (2014); William
K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2107, 2115-22, 2127 (2017) (contending that Justice Scalia staunchly defended
the Court’s extraordinarily deferential nondelegation doctrine because he believed that judges
could legitimately apply only fixed legal rules rather than discretionary standards (such as
an “intelligible principle”), but emphasizing that Scalia never considered the doctrine’s
historical meaning).
279. See supra notes 9, 101-08, 112, 122 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 101-02, 107-08 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 108, 112, 122-28, 268-74 and accompanying text (emphasizing that
the Court has found that every challenged congressional delegation contained a sufficiently
“intelligible principle” to guide the executive branch).
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responsibility, for onerous and costly regulations.282 For instance,
members of Congress can take credit for passing a law to “prevent
and control” air pollution (a surefire political winner),283 but shift
the hard details (including economically damaging regulations) and
political responsibility to the Environmental Protection Agency. The
Court has found that all federal regulatory statutes contain an
“intelligible principle,”284 which indicates that this standard has no
real legal content.
The conservative Justices cannot plausibly continue this pretend
judicial review while insisting that they are committed to enforcing
the Constitution as law. Instead, they should adopt a new test that
has some teeth: Congress cannot delegate its exclusive “legislative
Power[ ]” to make substantive policy choices that are crucial to its
statutory scheme, and Congress must enact statutory provisions
that are specific enough that an average citizen can evaluate their
advantages and disadvantages.285
Although application of this standard would require the Court to
exercise judgment in drawing certain lines, this task is not hopelessly arbitrary. For example, a federal statute that simply authorizes the executive branch to promulgate “fair competition codes” or
to regulate “in the public interest” would flunk that test.286 Conversely, the lengthy Affordable Care Act,287 despite its many constitutional and practical infirmities, lays out Congress’s major policy
judgments in detail: for instance, “guaranteed issue” of health insurance to all applicants;288 community rating to prevent insurers
from varying their premiums to account for preexisting conditions;289 an individual mandate to purchase an insurance policy;290
and a huge expansion of Medicaid to include poor citizens.291
282. See DAVID SCHOENBROD , POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 14 (1993).
283. See Clean Air Act of 1970 § 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4) (2012).
284. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-75 (2001).
285. See supra notes 102, 107 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 120-25, 269-71 and accompanying text (citing statutes that featured
such language).
287. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012).
289. Id. § 300gg(a)(1).
290. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
291. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (2012).
THE
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Overall, a Neo-Federalist approach would require the Court to
revive the nondelegation doctrine by setting forth concrete legal
standards that impose some genuine limits on Congress. Otherwise,
the conservative Justices’ professed commitment of faithfulness to
the Constitution’s text, structure, and history is empty rhetoric.
CONCLUSION
Justice Cardozo played a crucial role in persuading the Court to
retreat from its fierce resistance to New Deal legislation enacted
under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and General Welfare
Clauses—and to the broad delegations of rulemaking power contained in those statutes. Shortly after his death, however, the FDRappointed Justices abandoned all restraints on federal power—
even the modest and reasonable ones suggested by Justice Cardozo.
That judicial default has sacrificed the many valuable benefits of
federalism and separation of powers. The Court should try to repair
the damage to the Constitution’s structure by developing and enforcing principled Neo-Federalist limits on the federal government.

